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Abstract. Some aspects of Federigo Enriques mathematical philosophy thought are taken as 
central reference points for a critical historic-epistemological comparison between it and some 
of the main aspects of the philosophical thought of other his contemporary thinkers like, 
Gaston Bachelard and Hermann Weyl. From what will be exposed, it will be also possible to 
make out possible educational implications of the historic-epistemological approach. 
1. Introduction 
 
Even in modern textbooks and treatises on History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, both Italian
1
 
and foreign, there exist neither a whole chapter nor few sections, devoted to the fundamental epistemological 
work of Federigo Enriques, whose philosophical thought is dismissed in few lines amongst the subjects 
related to the modern Italian Philosophy between the end of the 19th-Century and the beginning of the 20th- 
one. An exception is made by both some prefaces to the various anastatic reprints of Federigo Enriques 
works and some remarkable collective and proceeding works mainly edited by the Centro Studi Federigo 
Enriques in Livorno (IT). All that is quite unfair respect to the wide cleverness and acuteness of the 
forerunner Enriques’ thought: he has been remembered only for his high and celebrated contributions to 
Algebraic Geometry, and only recently a certain further attention has appeared towards this author
2
. 
  An almost identical or similar fate has been undergone by Giovanni Vailati, almost to witness that absurd 
but real (and still effective) kind of reciprocal dislike that there exist, by both sides, between philosophers 
and scientists, which embed its historical roots into the secular dispute between Geisteswissenschaften on the 
one hand, and the Naturwissenschaften on the other hand
3
. Historically, many renowned scholars have tried 
to settle such a dispute, but with very poor results, despite of the immemorial historical course of the 
scientific culture. In Italy then this problematic situation has been (and still is) much more incisive than 
abroad, above all after the famous strong disagreement which has had as main protagonists the neo-Hegelian 
idealistic philosophers (amongst whom Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce) against the neo-positivist 
ones (amongst whom Antonio Aliotta, Roberto Ardigò and Ugo Spirito). 
  Federigo Enriques (1871-1946) was one of the main Italian scientists, near to the exponents of the logic 
positivism and of the neo-rationalism, who tried (unfortunately, in vain) to overcome this useless gap 
between the ones and the others. Just (but not exclusively) on particular aspects of this last wholehearted 
attempt of reconciliation and the underlying philosophical motivations, it is based this brief note; in 
particular, we would like to highlight one of the main implications of Enriques’ work, namely that 
concerning his unappreciated intuitions on the general science education side. 
 
2. Enriques and the Italian philosophy of the time 
 
In what follows, we mainly consider the few lines written by Ludovico Geymonat in (Geymonat, 1976, 
Volume VII, Chapter XI and Volume VIII, Chapter III) who was one of the main exponents of the Italian 
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 For instance, Ludovico Geymonat, in his celebrated treatise on history of philosophic and scientific thought – see 
(Geymonat, 1976) – devotes a whole chapter to the life and work of Gaston Bachelard but not to those of Federigo 
Enriques. This turns out to be even stranger because of the fact that the same Geymonat has been a supporter and a 
follower of Enriques work, as himself has affirmed. Moreover, this author devote sections of his treatise to Giovanni 
Vailati and even to Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Chapter XI), but not to 
Enriques, who is mentioned, here and there in few lines, in such a chapter. Likewise for the Nicola Abbagnano (see 
(Abbagnano, 1993-1995)) treatise. 
2
 See, above all, the works of Mario Castellana quoted in References. See also the recent interesting paper (Lolli, 2012). 
3
 See (Dalla Chiara & Toraldo di Francia, 1999, Chapter 15, Section 15.1) and (von Weizsäcker, 1994, Chapter V, 
Section 6.B). 
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neo-positivistic current of the 20th-Century, on the wake left by his predecessors, amongst whom the same 
Enriques.  
  The main fact that immediately jumps out to the attention is related to the known, difficult relationships 
between the Italian philosophy and the scientific context of the time
4
, whose main causes should be ascribed 
to the Croce and Gentile
5
 neo-idealism. Nevertheless, it wouldn’t be historically correct neglect certain other 
antecedent facts which will concur to exacerbate such problematic relationships. Indeed, some of the main 
exponents of the same Italian neo-positivism of the end of 19th-Century, amongst whom Roberto Ardigò, did 
not give the right relevance that will deserve the fundamental epistemological works made, for instance, by 
Vailati, Peano and Beltrami as concern the foundations of mathematics. Amongst them, above all Giovanni 
Vailati (1863-1909) tried to stem this incipient breaking between the Italian philosophers and the scientific 
thought, having as reference point the recent work and thought manifested by Federigo Enriques since the 
last years of the 19th-Century, who, after the premature death of Vailati, continued himself, in first person, to 
bring forward this program of reciprocal collaboration.  
  Nevertheless, it is historically well-known as both valuable aims, not only intentionally manifested but also 
put in practice with remarkable factual works
6
, failed or were ignored, with the consequent eclipsing of the 
anti-idealistic philosophical trends and with all the consequent harmful results still today present into the 
Italian cultural setting. Almost like a sort of unfair retaliation of the destiny against these benevolent 
reconciliation and collaborative attempts, to confirmation of the Saint Bernard of Clairvaux maxim according 
to which «the good intentions pave the hell’s roads», Enriques and Vailati were almost neglected by the 
same Italian culture as regard their philosophical works; only abroad they received major attention, again to 
confirmation of another Latin maxim according to which «nemo propheta in patria est
7
». 
  Nevertheless, the appreciated collaborative and mentally-open perspectives of Enriques, had remarkable 
parallel attempts in some foreign notable thinkers, among whom Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) and 
Hermann  Weyl (1855-1955), of whom herein we wish to point out certain common aspects of their thought
8
,  
putting them in critical comparison with the Enriques ones. 
 
3. Enriques, Bachelard and Weyl: some comparative attempts 
 
As already said above and as recalled by Geymonat in (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VIII, Chapter III), the 
causes of the failure of Enriques philosophical program (with the consequent neglect of the related thought)  
must not be imputed only to his controversy with Croce and Gentile, albeit it played a pivotal role, but also 
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 For brief outlines concerning the relationships between Mathematics and Philosophy in the beginning of the 20th-
Century, see also (Berzolari, 1978, Article LXI, Section 4), where, amongst other, there is a rich related literature. 
5
 Just in regards to Giovanni Gentile, it is notable to recall as his son Giovannino Gentile Jr. (1906-1942) was a great 
physicist prematurely died. For some brief biobibliographical notes on him, see (Bernardini & Bonolis, 2002) and 
(Bernardini, 2007) (see also the Preface of Gilberto Bernardini to (Bernardini et al., 1947) in which there are further 
interesting historical remarks), from which emerges that, after all, the same Giovanni Gentile senior wasn’t so adverse 
to the scientific knowledge as could seem at a first sight; indeed, he left full freedom to the studies chosen by his son, 
even eulogizing, also publicly (see (Gentile, 1941)), the natural sciences and their Galileian experimental method. 
Instead, it was above all Croce the main opponent of the scientific knowledge, very likely to counteract a possible 
advent of the neo-positivistic thought mainly headed by the so-called Vienna Circle (but also by the Berliner 
Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie of H. Reichenbach, near to the former) to whom Enriques was into 
contact, strong of position conquered by him within the Italian Philosophical Society. On the other hand, after the death 
of his son, Gentile senior published too a book entitled Scritti minori (di scienza, filosofia e letteratura) which collect 
all the publications of his son, and from which, besides, clearly emerges an extraordinary eclecticism of Gentile junior 
quite similar to that of Enriques, even in the undergone fait. Indeed, the same Gentile junior was also discriminated, 
both by scientists and humanists, for his attempts to unify the humanistic disciplines with the scientific ones; only 
Giovanni Polvani and Ettore Majorana were estimators of his singular work, Ettore Majorana having also been a his 
strict friend (which is quite strange seen his character).  
6
 In particular, the basic works I problemi della scienza (1906) and Scienza e razionalismo (1912), despite had been 
criticized first by Gentile then, above all, by Croce, earned to Enriques, for some years, the presidency of the same 
Italian Philosophical Society. The journal Scientia – Rivista di sintesi scientifica, founded in 1907, was the result of the 
great Enriques’ foresight and established just as a place of meeting and cultural exchange between philosophers and 
scientists. 
7
 And this maxim reached its highest achievement just relatively to the fate of the journal Scientia, whose initial 
programmatic manifesto was formed by the celebrated book I problemi della scienza (1906). 
8
 For other aspects, we refer to (Redondi, 1978). 
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to the same mathematical community of the time. In fact, the latter was regulated by an its own ‘internal 
behavioural deontological codex’ according to which was seen with extreme diffidence every attempt turned 
toward historical, philosophical and foundational (above all logical) questions. It is then very strange as such 
a mental crease was long present, as a kind of internal pure idealism, into the mathematical sciences which 
were mainly understood – also nowadays – as totally detached from any type of problematic which did not 
be of a purely theoretical nature or, at most, technical-applicative. After an initial good consideration, 
Enriques was yet soon isolated both by the Italian philosophical society and (mainly for these his first 
interests) by the same mathematical community which was completely unrelated to these type of studies, a 
human fate this which was also experienced by Bachelard (see (Geymonat, 1976, Chapter X, Section II)). 
  Enriques was just one of the few ones to try changing this unilateral perspective within the Italian context. 
In this framework, we want to consider what was the same situation abroad, limiting ourselves to few 
authors. In France, the general dislike towards the Logic found an influential supporter in Poincaré that 
opposed the initiative of the logician Louis Couturat to introduce the Peano and Russell ideas in his country, 
notwithstanding Poincaré himself was one of the greatest French scholar of Epistemology and Philosophy of 
Science, together to P. Duhem, the latter moreover a strenuous opponent of the Logicism. Both did 
themselves paladins of an antidogmatic conception of the science, involving a certain convenctionalism; 
their ideas were thereafter retaken by their successors, amongst whom L. Brunscvicg, É. Meyerson, A. Rey 
and A. Koyré, till to Gaston Bachelard who is considered as the most original thinker in this type of studies. 
For shortness, we refer also to (Abbagnano, 1995, Chapter XI, Section 799) for the exposition of the main 
outlines of Bachelard thought.  
  With a license in Mathematics and Philosophy, but first of all historian of science, Bachelard have drawn 
inspiration sources for his further epistemological reflection from his scientific researches. His conceptions 
are nevertheless different from the neo-positivistic ones for a major historicization of the scientific thought, 
this last being also seen from the various historical, technical, social, cultural and psychological standpoints 
in which it has evolved. He considers philosophy and science as inseparably connected among them; 
furthermore, according to him, it does not exist only one science but different sciences or an irreducible 
plurality of knowledge
9
 and specific techniques, speaking of an applied rationalism which is very close to 
the Enriques experimental and critical rationalisms (see (Redondi, 1978, Chapter V, Footnote 
43
) and 
(Castellana, 1974)). Both these philosophical trends were substantially motivated by their common interests 
for physical questions (and connected relationships with mathematics) which, among other things, have also 
been as valid and useful educational tool for exact sciences (see (Castelnuovo, 1907)), in particular for 
mathematics itself. Furthermore, both Enriques and Bachelard were quite adverse to the idealistic theses 
notwithstanding they always tried to classify and to compare their studies in the more general framework of 
the great philosophical systems
10
.  
  Nevertheless, this closeness between their rationalisms does not completely extend to their respective 
conception and role played by the history of science, that in Enriques coincides with the history of 
philosophy
11
 and goes on from past to future in a continuous manner (see (Enriques, 1938)), whereas in 
Bacherlard, though science and philosophy are inseparably connected between them (like in Enriques), 
nevertheless the history of science is guided only by the current rational values and only minimally is 
influenced by the past because of ‘discontinuities’ due to the occurrence of certain breakings12 (see later). 
Instead, a common point in their conception of the history of science methodology is findable in certain 
psychologistic tendencies of both authors: for instance, Enriques, in (Enriques, 1938), states that the study of 
the historic-phenomenological evolution of scientific ideas may turn out to be useful for understanding the 
genesis of the same scientific ideas, from which emerges the necessary inseparable copresence both of 
rational and empirical factor in the birth and development of it (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VIII, Chapter 
III, Section II)). This last perspective is also considered – hence, again in agreement with Enriques – both by 
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 In this regards, see the epistemological and multidimensional perspectives of conceptual changes in science education 
context, as for instance outlined by (Treagust & Duit, 2009), which, amongst other things, just reminds the Bachelard’s 
epistemological profile. 
10
 For instance, Bachelard, in his philosophical conception of epistemology and science, outlines a sort of  philosophical 
topology in which to place the various historical philosophical systems respect to which comparing the same historical 
evolution of science (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Chapter X, Section V)). In this, Bachelard and Enriques are 
very tight.  
11
 Almost to paradoxically border on the Crocian historical conception of knowledge. 
12
 In this sense, anticipating the Thomas S. Kuhn thought about scientific revolutions. 
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Bachelard
13
 (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Chapter, X, Section III) and by Weyl in (Weyl, 1949, 
Chapter 5, Section 21) where the he argues on the formation of scientific theories, just reporting the Enriques 
conception of the continuous epistemic role played by the history of science in the formation of itself. A 
fundamental tool to pursue this common Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl standpoint, is just the history of 
science intended not as an erudite research but as a dynamic and active research of the scientific spirit, 
considered along its diachronic and synchronic development
14
.  
  According to Bachelard, the scientific progress, instead, does not take place through a continuous and 
unilateral process but through epistemological breakings respect to the previous theoretical schemes, which, 
in turn, may take place only overcoming the various epistemological obstacles
15
 that hinder the science path. 
Nevertheless, Bachelard inherited some of the main themes common to his predecessors, above all Poincaré 
and Duhem, like the aversion to the logic, the antiempiricism (differently by Enriques), the tendency to link 
the criticism of science with its history, the essential original creative nature of the theories, and so on. In 
particular, his contrariness to the logicism and formalism of Peano, Russell and Hilbert, puts him on a same 
level respect to Enriques who was notoriously into very cold relationships with Peano as noted by Mario 
Castellana in (Castellana, 1973) – who, inter alia, has also made fundamental epistemological studies just on 
the authors here considered: see (Castellana, 2004), (Castellana, 2005) and (Castellana, 2010), in which a 
deeper comparative historic-epistemological analysis of these authors is made.  
  Contrarily to his teacher Brunschvicg who considers the mathematics as a simple linguistic tool, Bachelard 
claims as the mathematics is the pillar of discovery that creates the modern physical science, in opposition to 
the so-called ‘doctrinaires of axiomatic’ like Hilbert. According to Bachelard (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume 
VII, Chapter X, Section III)), every formal thought is an incomplete psychological exemplification since it is 
a kind of never reached limit-thought, or else it is a thought around a some subject; it concerns hidden 
images, which will be auxiliary to build up the related formal framework. The mathematics of the new 
physics is fed by its own experimental applications, whereas the science, in its educational aspects (to whom 
Bachelard devotes much attention), cannot be exposed in its direct axiomatic form (against the later 
Bourbakism
16
) but it should first be exposed for being understood, upon which thereafter building up its 
rigorous theoretical framework. To this purpose, according to Bachelard, the mathematics should be taught 
with an applicative method oriented toward the sciences, like physics and chemistry, hence together these. 
From all that, it is evident the common points with the related Enriques thought, which was notoriously 
opposed to any form of strict and curt formalism, as well as favourable to this educational way of teaching.  
  On the other hand, the Enriques’ dislike to logicism is clearly identifiable in someone of his fundamental 
works on Algebraic Geometry: indeed, taking into account the introduction
17
 of Guido Castelnuovo – who 
was one of the closer collaborator of Enriques, and himself a clever mathematician – to the posthumous 
publication of the first 1942 edition of the basic work (Enriques, 1949), it is possible to glimpse what 
practical conception of the mathematics had Enriques. From that, Castelnuovo also expresses an his own 
worry as concerns the new course undertaken by the mathematics at the beginnings of the 20th-Century, 
which was quite different from the intuitive and imaginative one characterizing the very fruitful and 
advantageous 19th-Century mathematical thought. On the basis of Enriques work, Castelnuovo argues on the 
new way of doing mathematics in the first half of the 20th-Century, more oriented toward the technical and 
logical aspects rather than sight, at first the general framework of the mathematical question upon which then  
formally building up the theory. This is compared too with an analogous situation which was taking place in 
the artistic context of the time: even there, the imagination and fantasy were dismissed and pejoratively 
considered as arising from the romantic era, giving instead more consideration to the technical and tool 
aspects. From all that, it is evident why rightly Enriques did not appreciate the logicistic way of doing 
mathematics that has gradually taken place ever more. Enriques tried to find confirmations to his way of 
seeing mathematics into the philosophical context, reaching to very original and interesting, innovative 
explanatory modes concerning a mathematical reasoning, with possible pedagogical insights. 
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 Under a certain Husserlian philosophy influence. 
14
 Albeit these authors give a different weight just to these two basic aspects of the historical evolution: for instance, 
Enriques gives much more importance to the diachronic aspects, whereas Bachelard give more attention to the 
synchronic ones. 
15
 Besides, to explain their occurrence, Bachelard appeal, inter alia, to the Freudian and Jungian psychoanalytic theories 
as well as to the Husserlian phenomenology. The epistemological obstacle theory led thereafter Bachelard to his 
Philosophy of No, which will have fruitful implications from an educational viewpoint (see (Treagust & Duit, 2008)). 
16
 On interesting historic-epistemological remarks on Bourbakism in mathematics, see (Israel, 1977). 
17
 See (Enriques, 1949, pp. V-VIII). 
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The intuitive and imagination view in mathematics, was that mainly adopted and thereafter carried out by the 
great mathematicians of the 19th-Century, like Gauss, Riemann, Abel, Jacoby, Poincaré and others. To 
clearer make the idea of that, we herein report the exact Castelnuovo textual words, which we surely may 
consider reflecting what Enriques himself believed in this regards
18
 
 
«La fantasia, la intuizione che guidavano la ricerca di allora sono oggi guardate con sospetto per il 
terrore degli errori a cui possono condurre. Le teorie sorgevano per rispondere al bisogno che il 
matematico provava di delineare e precisare degli oggetti del pensiero che erano già, in forma vaga, 
presenti alla sua mente. Era l’esplorazione di un ampio territorio intravisto da una cima lontana. Si 
costruirono così nel secolo scorso quei gioielli che si chiamano teoria delle funzioni analitiche, delle 
funzioni ellittiche, abeliane, superficie ad area minima, superficie cubiche…. Oggi più che il terreno 
da esplorare interessa la via che vi conduce, e questa via ora vien seminata di ostacoli artificiali, ora 
si libra tra le nuvole». 
 
[«The fantasy and the intuition which driven the research of then, are nowadays seen with suspicious 
due to the fear to make errors to which them may lead. The theories born for answering to the 
mathematician’s need for outlining and specify the objects of her/his thought which were already 
preformed in her/his mind but into a vague form. It was like the exploration of a wide land sighted 
from a far peak. So, those jewels named analytic function theory, elliptic and Abelian functions, cubic 
and minimal area surfaces, and so on, arose from this way of doing mathematics in the last century. 
Today, rather than the landscape to explore, there is more interest to the formal way which leads to it, 
and this path is either sowed by artificial obstacles or hovers around the clouds».] 
 
As Poincaré himself said in his celebrated work (Poincaré, 1905), a mathematical construction is necessarily 
composed first by an intuitive process, which discovers, then by a logic process, which proves, coherently 
with what Enriques says just above through the Castelnuovo report. Hence, Enriques philosophy of 
mathematical thought is mainly based first on intuition, and this is a common perspective to almost all the 
celebrated exponents of the Italian algebraic geometry school of the time (among to which E. Beltrami, L. 
Cremona, F. Severi, E. Castelnuovo, C. Segre, B. Segre, G. Veronese, G. Fano and others). It is also in 
accordance with the Poincaré thought
19
 as well as with that of Riemann whose geometric standpoint was, 
amongst other, one of the main common point of the thought of Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl, as witnessed 
by (Castellana, 2004) and
20
 (Redondi, 1978). Furthermore, Enriques, Bachelard and Poincaré were also 
joined amongst them by the common, constant doing reference to the psychological sciences, but not in a 
reductive way. In this regards, the work of Enriques was abundant of suggestions for the subsequent works 
of Jean Piaget and Pierre Gonseth
21
 in epistemology, while the Poincaré philosophical legacy will be, for 
instance, later retaken by J. Hadamard in his celebrated work (Hadamard, 1945).   
  From that, it is easy to find interesting historical connections between the Enriques ideas and the work of 
another as much great mathematician, Hermann Weyl. Both authors were two among the greatest 
mathematicians of history whose work on pure and applied mathematics allowed them to be able to 
understand the various aspects of a mathematical reasoning, so that their philosophy mathematics thought 
should be taken into great account. As regards Weyl’s thought on the nature of mathematical reasoning, it is 
enough to recall
22
 as, according to him, in the edification of a mathematical theory, the general starting point 
is represented by what he calls an operative framework (Operationsbereich), formed by the choice of a 
number of fundamental categories of entities respect to which are given certain properties and relations, from 
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 The Enriques’ considerations are presently very true. 
19
 It is known as, after Poincaré, in France the logicism and formalism trends attained their highest height with the 
Bourbakism which has been the prevailing educational address until few years ago. In this regards, Vladimir I. Arnold, 
which may be considered as a great intuitive mathematician, was very critical on this, trying to reintroduce many 
mathematical textbooks oriented towards the intuitive and imaginary way of doing mathematics (from a PhD Seminar 
lesson held by Prof. Giorgio Bolondi). For a criticism against the Bourbakism trend from an educational viewpoint, see 
what says F.G. Tricomi in (Tricomi, 1967), which, besides, was also in a certain opposition to the Turin Peano’s school. 
See also (Israel, 1977). 
20
 To which we refer for a more careful study. 
21
 See Sections 1 and 2 of the introductory survey by O. Pompeo Faracovi to the Italian edition of (Enriques, 1938). 
Moreover, about the relationships among Enriques, Bachelard and Gonseth, see above all (Castellana, 2005). 
22
 In what follows, we refer to (Casari, 1972, Chapter XIII, Section 1). 
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which afterwards to go on for building up the whole theoretical system, through the creative iterative 
application of certain generative processes which include two main types, a logic process and a 
mathematical one. The former generate new properties and relations (said derived), starting from an initial 
stock of primitive relations and properties related to the entities of certain initial categories, applying the 
common usual elementary logical operations
23
; the latter, instead, allows to constitute new ideal entities from 
a given system of properties and relations related to certain entities already known, identifying hence a class 
of entities including only those having such properties. Subsequently, Weyl himself, in his celebrated work 
(Weyl, 1949, Chapter 1), represents this same distinction between logic and mathematical process by means 
of the distinction between combinatorial and creative definition, the combinatorial one being legitimated by 
the logic process, whereas the creative one is that legitimated by the mathematical process. The creative 
iteration of these two inseparable processes lead to the notions of types and orders, through the so-called 
expanded and limited processes. 
  The Weyl mathematical philosophy thought, relatively to the properly mathematical context, has evolved in 
time from the first work Das Kontinuum (1918) to the final Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science 
(1949) which is a revised and enlarged edition of a first German 1926 paper published in the Handbuch der 
Philosophie, and that recently it has been republished in a new 2009 edition with an introduction by the 
Physics Nobel laureate A.F. Wilczek regarding the parts more properly physical of this crucial Weylian 
work. We here do not wish to discuss the Weyl philosophical positions and their evolution, but rather point 
out only few of their aspects which may be quite close to the Enriques ones. First, both thinkers belonged to 
the very restrict class of pure scientists which could not do without to consider also the philosophical 
questions inherent a given mathematical or scientific problem: out of these, we remember Poincaré, 
Riemann, Einstein, Eddington, Mach, Russell and few other scientists of 19th- and 20th-Century; 
unfortunately, this is a valuable cultural tradition that will go ever more to disappear
24
. In particular, Weyl 
himself, in the Preface to (Weyl, 1949), states as it has been no possible to him leave aside from 
philosophical questions each time that the opportunity will arose, ever trying to put the given mathematical 
or physical question into comparison with the suitable known philosophical frameworks. On the other hand, 
it is never enough the importance given to the philosophical thought in motivating and stimulating the same 
mathematical or scientific production, in this case being sufficient to recall the Riemann
25
 and Einstein idea 
history. Furthermore, from every part of his book, it gives rise the Weylian idea according to which there is 
almost always a prevalence of the imaginative components for the occurrence of a mathematical insight
26
 
(either it concerns a proof or the institution of a new formal object).  
  On the other hand, quite recently, it have seen to appear some interesting researches about certain 
relationships between Sigmund Freud and Ludwig Wittgenstein ideas: amongst them, we remember only 
some papers of A.G. Gargani (see (Gargani, 2005); see also (Gargani, 1982) and (Pagnini, 2009)) in which, 
inter alia, the author wants bringing together the psychoanalysis with the analytical philosophy – above all in 
the Wittgensteinian sense – on the one hand and the methods of constructivist knowledge on the other hand, 
recalling into question just the mathematical constructivism of Weyl, Brouwer and of the same Wittgenstein. 
From here, a rather indirect link between the last Weylian mathematical philosophy thought and the 
psychological science, like in the Enriques work, it is possible to descry. 
  Moreover, taking also into account the physical science
27
, in the work (Weyl, 1932) the author explains 
which should be the so-called essence of the new scientific mind turned towards the contemplation of a 
pluralistic and dynamic open world put into not aggressive but sympathetic relationships with the religious 
spirit. In this regards, Weyl devotes the first chapter of his work, entitled God and the Universe, to discuss 
just these last aspects, trying to justify the apparent contrasts which can arise if this argument is carried out 
by a mathematician. On the other hand, this last type of extreme and romantic philosophical digressions 
weren’t estrange to the same Enriques which, in this regards, so he expresses himself at the end of his 
celebrated work (Enriques, 1949, Chapter XI, Section 9) 
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 And therefore characterized by a low degree of creativity, differently from the mathematical one. 
24
 Today being almost inexistent. 
25
 In particular, as regards Riemann, it is enough to remember the basic notable influence exerted on his scientific 
production by the thought of the anti-idealist German philosopher J.F. Herbart (1776-1841) and by that of G.Th. 
Fechner (1801-1887) (see the Introduction by R. Pettoello to (Riemann, 1994)). 
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 This being in accordance with the recent research results on mathematical thought, according to which it is strictly 
connected with visual-spatial skills. All this is of fundamental importance from an educational viewpoint. 
27
 And the constant and repeated attention to these, also provides a further common point of the Weyl and Enriques 
thought. 
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«A questo punto ci sia consentito fermarci un istante, come in un’ascensione alpina si ama sostare sul 
picco conseguito e di là contemplare lo spettacolo della Natura che si offre alla vista.  
  Cinquant’anni or sono s’iniziava in Italia lo studio di queste teorie [delle superfici algebriche], 
appena abbozzate dal genio di un precursore (Max Noether); allora, scherzando sulle difficoltà e le 
eccezioni che s’incontravano da ogni parte, si soleva dire che, mentre le curve algebriche (già 
composte in una teoria armonica) sono create da Dio, le superficie invece sono opera del Demonio
28
. 
  Ora si palesa invece che piacque a Dio di creare per le superficie un ordine di armonie più riposte 
ove rifulge una meravigliosa bellezza, e ch’Ei volle in esse – diciamo col Poeta –  
 
                                                        del creator suo spirito, 
più vasta orma stampar. 
 
La ricchezza delle proprietà e la bellezza, lungamente nascosta, che qui si palesano, non debbono 
costituire ragione di vano orgoglio per la scuola geometrica italiana o per i geometri stranieri che 
hanno collaborato a scoprirle, ma piuttosto debbono suscitare un senso di reverenza per quell’ordine 
meraviglioso degli enti matematici, che il pensiero trova innanzi a sé e quasi raccoglie, al pari delle 
specie viventi, dalla Natura Madre; e così alimentare la fede dei giovani ricercatori che dietro alle 
difficoltà, alle eccezioni, alle apparenti incongruenze, c’è realmente in questo mondo di enti, una 
divina armonia, che gli sforzi concordi degli studiosi riusciranno sempre meglio a mettere in luce». 
 
[«To this point, there be allowed us stop for an instant, like when in an alpine climbing, it is loved to 
have a break in the achieved peak and admire the Nature spectacle which is offered to our own eyes. 
Fifty years ago, in Italy began the study of these theories [that is to say, those of algebraic surfaces] 
just sketched by the geniality of a precursor (Max Noether); then, joking on the difficulties and the 
exceptions met in every its part, it was customary to say that, whilst the algebraic curves (already 
systemized into an harmonic theory) were made by God, the surfaces were conversely due to Devil. 
Now, instead, it has disclosed that pleased to God to create for surfaces an order of more secret 
harmonies, from which shines a wonderful beauty, and that, into them, He wanted – saying, with the 
poet –  
 
    of the creator’s soul, 
     the wider trace to imprint.       
 
The property richness and their long hidden beauty, which here are manifested, shouldn’t be reason of 
vain pride for the Italian geometric school or for the foreign geometers who have concurred to 
discover them, but rather should arouse a reverential sense for that beautiful order of the 
mathematical object realm that the thought finds before itself and almost accepts, like a living specie, 
from Nature Mother. And this, in such a way to nourish the faith of young researchers since, behind 
the difficulties, the exceptions and the apparent inconsistencies, in the realm of such entities really 
there exists a divine harmony that the agreed attempts of the various scholars ever better will be able 
to put in light».] 
 
The treatise (Enriques, 1949), that Castelnuovo himself remembers to be one of the most important work of 
Enriques devoted to Algebraic Geometry, was prepared just after he was graduated from Scuola Normale 
Superiore of Pisa, and subsequently underwent to continuous remaking and revision till to the last years of 
his life. However, beyond the remarkable geometrical insights, one of the main features of the whole book is 
just the intuitive and imaginative method with which are treated the geometrical questions therein 
introduced, though these led himself to undergo various critical essays as regard the proof correctness of 
                                                          
28
 In this regards, it circulates too another similar maxim but concerning the integer and complex numbers, in part 
included in that due to L. Kronecker according to which «the integer numbers are due to the God’s action, everything 
else being due to the human’s one». The further addendum according to which yet «the complex numbers are due to the 
Devil’s action», seems instead to be anonymous.  
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certain theorems, notwithstanding the importance of the achieved results
29
. This peculiar way of doing 
mathematics is characteristic of that unique kind of scientific-humanistic trend which Enriques wanted to 
pursue and that was partially retaken and kept alive by very few of some of his pupils, amongst whom  
Geymonat himself, A. Frajese (1902-1986), L. Campedelli (1903-1978) and L. Lombardo-Radice (1916-
1982). The latter, in his preface to the anastatic reprint of (Enriques, 1938), remembers some of these 
distinguishing Enriques features, first of all his attempts to overcome the reductive barrier, or fence, between 
the Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, gap, this, which was inexistent in him since the 
beginning of his juvenile studies. The link between philosophical and exact sciences was of an indissoluble 
and mutual character in Enriques training, who was hostile to any form of extreme specialization, nourishing 
a sense of circular unity of knowledge, and mastering a great quantity of cognitions in many fields of 
knowledge but without never becoming a specialist (with an exception for Algebraic Geometry). Maybe, just 
due to this, he undergone the unhappy fate of the beaten and lonely scientist, like Bachelard, even if such a 
condition did not weight on his spiritual serenity that characterized almost the whole of his life.  
  In short, there have been notable scientists, like Weyl and Enriques (and, in part, also Bachelard if one takes 
into account his curriculum vitӕ and studiorum), whose scientific work couldn’t be disjoined by the 
philosophical speculation: for them, it is valid what Weyl himself says, namely that there exist men, like 
artists, scientists, technologists or politicians, which devote themselves to the construction, whereas others 
devote themselves to the reflection and to the philosophical speculation. These two types of attitudes should 
actively integrate among them, otherwise the creativity loses itself into the mechanicalness of pure routine, 
while the reflection becomes abstract and void natter. Another educational-methodological lesson! 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The intuitive and imaginative manner to approach, in a first phase, an arbitrary mathematical question, as 
understood above all by Enriques and Weyl, but also by Bachelard on the wake left by Poincaré via 
Brunschvicg (see (Geymonat, 1976, Volume VII, Chapter X, Section III)), might have non-negligible 
implications from an educational perspectives if one considers the mathematics like an immanent order of 
the Nature or an intelligible reality external to our mind (like Plato), so re-evoking the medieval controversy 
between realists and nominalists. In this regards, according to Enriques and Castelnuovo (see his basic, but 
little known, paper (Castelnuovo, 1907)), the methodology of Physics might play a fundamental educational 
role also from a mathematical viewpoint, above all in Geometry
30
. 
  They surely are visual mathematicians rather than abstract ones, above all Enriques that applied this 
mathematical philosophy to the active geometrical research field of the time, reaching to unique and valuable 
results: the work (Enriques, 1949) is considered as a valuable source of mathematical ideas as concerns the 
algebraic geometry of surfaces, although it were found some proofs little correct from a pure formal 
viewpoint and that the same author tried to remedy with a continuous revision of his work, but without 
substantial changes in its remarkable content of ideas. Castelnuovo himself, in the introduction to (Enriques, 
1949), affirms that Enriques was forced to improve his work because of certain critical essays moved by 
formalists to the proofs of some his theorems. On the other hand, it was well-known, and Castelnuovo and 
Enriques themselves were aware of this, in what state was the theory of algebraic surface at that time, hoping 
in a future improvement of it, from a formal viewpoint
31
. 
  In short, from what has been said so far, it clearly emerges that almost every creative mathematical process 
necessarily, at first, should take place by means of an intuitive and imaginative approach which could 
thereafter be corrected or improved by a subsequent formal or abstract revision phase which, in turn, might 
to provide further results susceptible of possible physical interpretations (like the discovery of antimatter 
                                                          
29
 Nevertheless, only recently he has been, in a certain sense, ‘rehabilitated’ from these last criticisms, because it has 
been ascertained, a posteriori, the formal correctness of his proofs.  
30
 As regards the experimental character of mathematics, see also the brief but important note of Jean Leray in 
(Hamburger, 1986). 
31
 Which, besides, couldn’t take place without these initial results. However, this intuitive way of working was common 
among the above mentioned exponents of the so-called Italian geometric school (in part, following that of the German 
tradition dating back to Riemann, Klein and von Helmholtz), which yet attained to original and remarkable results in the 
geometric field. Only subsequently many other mathematicians, above all not Italians, improved their results from a 
formal and abstract viewpoint, often arguing (although unjustly) against such a School, in particular toward Enriques 
and Severi. Among them, it is no possible to omit the name of Oscar Zariski, who scientifically growth just within such 
a celebrated school and into its stimulating context. 
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expected by the physical interpretation of the eigenvalue problem solutions of electron Dirac’s relativistic 
equation deduced from a formal relativistic extension of the Schrödinger equation). In particular, the main 
theses on the real nature of mathematics by Enriques, come just from the geometric context, that is to say, 
the Geometry, as say, is one of the main epistemological paradigms of a neo-Platonic conception of 
mathematics. Among the contemporary thinkers who agree with such an Enriques’ view, we recall H. 
Freudenthal – that, among other things, has tried to apply this program to the educational context32 – and R. 
Thom (who acquired the related Poincaré’s thought legacy). All this is coherent (and prodromal) with the 
modern cognitive science researches according to which, as already said, at the basis of the mathematical 
thought there are above all visual-spatial skills. In any way, nowadays it is almost inexistent this type of 
reciprocal useful and fruitful relationships between Mathematics, History and Philosophy which might also 
turn to be useful from an educational standpoint
33
. 
  In conclusion, from Poincaré, on the French side, and from Riemann, Klein and von Helmholtz, on the 
German side, Enriques pick up these influences, coeval respectively to the Bachelard and Weyl ideas, to 
originally develop his thought towards an intuitive view of mathematics – and applying it to his pioneering 
geometrical researches. His work and programmes will reach the highest values with the L.E.J. Brouwer 
intuitionism
34
, does not never neglect the related philosophical counterpart. And this has been just the 
leitmotiv that has led to the drawing up this brief note, ever bearing in mind the claim according to which, in 
our simple opinion, the historical considerations (as those so far done) might have some educational 
implications both for natural sciences and mathematics
35
. 
 
Remarks. In this paper, we have limited ourselves to point out those points of Bachelard, Enriques and Weyl 
thought which overall lead, amongst other, to the revaluation of that line of thought referring to the visual 
and intuitive conception of mathematics dating back to Plato and Socrates. Between Bachelard and Enriques, 
via Poincaré, we have tried to identify some common points more oriented toward the philosophy and history 
of science than toward the relationships between mathematics and physics, which besides are also present. 
Instead, as regard Enriques and Weyl, we have put more attention to these last types of basic relationships, as 
well as the relationships between philosophy and science, even if the historical questions are strongly present 
more in the Enriques thought than in the Weyl one. For other as much interesting common points among the 
mathematical philosophy thought of these authors, we refer to (Redondi, 1978).  
  In any way, as repeatedly said, we want to stress out what fundamental educational role may play the 
philosophical and epistemological thought in science, the works of Enriques and Weyl, as well as the 
Bachelard one, being enough to prove this. Besides, all this has already been largely witnessed by some 
recent science education researches (see (Treagust & Duit, 2008)).  
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 Furthermore, the names of H. von Helmholtz and H. Freudenthal are also historically related to some important 
problems concerning the axiomatic characterization of the so-called Physical Geometry, an important field of studies 
linking together basic physical questions (also correlated to General Relativity) and formal geometrical arguments (like 
the Riemann-Helmholtz-Lie and Yamabe problems), which has a main study subject the so-called problem of the space. 
It derives from some of those multiple intersections between Physics and Geometry, whose program is builds up along 
the lines traced by the works made by Riemann, Poincaré, Helmholtz, Klein (in this regards, of this author see above all 
(Klein, 1926-27)) and Enriques, on these arguments (for more information, see (Schmidt, 1979), (Freudenthal, 1965) 
and (Moore, 1919)). On the other hand, Weyl himself has had also to do with such questions, as proves his fundamental 
work (Weyl, 1923), so that, via Chapter IV (related to Geometry) of the 1906 Enriques work I problemi della Scienza, it 
is possible en passant to identify another common point which goes from Helmholtz, Riemann and Lie till to Weyl, in 
considering and treating this ‘’problem of the space’’ (that, besides, will deserve a more historical attention). 
33
 Bruno D’Amore, in (D’Amore, 2001, pp.75-76), highlight just these possible perspectives as arising from a 
constructive cooperation between historical questions and educational programs, but remembering too as so far nobody 
has put into practice this program, despite of distinguished historical attempts dating back just to Enriques, Campedelli 
and Lombardo-Radice. For instance, that valuable tendency to insert historical notes at the end of the various chapters 
of scientific textbooks and treatises, it’s losing by this time. Nevertheless, on the epistemological side, a modern 
exception is given by the notable work of the theoretical physicists and science philosopher Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker (1912-2007), among whom related works we mention, for our purposes, only (von Weizsäcker, 1994). 
34
 In this regards, see also (Fieschi, 1976, Volume II, Appendix B, Section III.D). 
35
 For instance, the Bachelard’s epistemological profile is considered in the conceptual change theory of science 
education: in this regards, see (Treagust & Duit, 2008, pp. 312-313). 
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